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The main purpose of this first book-length survey of ontic structural realism (OSR) is to 
convince the reader that the ontology of the physical world is one of “structures” and not of 
“objects”. Despite the impressive range of topics that are accurately and exhaustively 
presented – continuity across scientific change, the underdetermination of metaphysics by 
physical theories, an historical survey on 20th structuralism, the role of models and of group 
theory in the representation of structures, the relationship between structures and other key 
metaphysical notions (objects, causation, modality, dispositions, biological individuals) – my 
final impression is that the main objective has not been reached.  
The reason has to do with the fact that the simple question: “what is physical (rather than 
mere mathematical) structure?” has received at best a very vague answer. Consequently, as 
we will see, French is forced to navigate between the Scilla of Tegmark’s Pitagoreanism 
(2008) and the Caribdi of “blobobjectivism” (Horgan and Potrč 2008), namely the claim that 
the whole physical universe is a single concrete structurally complex but partless cosmos (a 
“blob”). The former alternative is discussed and then, understandably, rejected. While it is not 
clear whether French endorses the latter alternative as a plausible ontological rendering of 
“physical structure” (173-4, 183, 189) – he presents its pros and cons2 – he does not seem too 
unsympathetic about it. In any case, I will argue that, insofar as I can understand OSR, 
blobobjectivism is its most coherent development but is a rather inadequate way to make 
sense of the ontology of contemporary physics.  
Given the above dilemma, the challenge of clarifying the nature of “physical structure” has 
not been taken up yet. In part, this follows from the fact that French often does not take stock 
among the various responses that he discusses to defend OSR from foreseeable obections. His 
review of the literature is always accompanied by new arguments, but he plays defensively: 
                                                
1 Thanks to Angelo Cei and Elena Castellani for their critical comments on a previous draft of 
2 I think this follows despite the fact that French does not endorse Horgan and Potrč’s 
contextualist semantics. 
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aware of the difficulties generated by his ambitious program, he seems just content to show 
that some of his responses are viable, without trying to explore them in depth and defend OSR 
more effectively. This is more evident when the going gets tough, in particular in chapters 7 
and 8, which deal, respectively, with his attempt to eliminate an ontology of objects and with 
the problem of clarifying the difference between physical and mathematical structures. Here 
the arguments are more sketchy and promissory, and they probably only aim to open new 
paths for future research.  
After having expressed my opinion, the fact that French’s knowledge of physics, 
metaphysics and possible ways of relating them is encyclopaedic as well as precise is 
uncontroversial. Many readers will learn a lot (as I did) from a book that succeeds in 
illuminating many philosophical questions about the ontology of physics by using OSR as its 
only focus. But the best way to pay due homage to a thought-provocative book is to criticize 
it, and I hope that my objections will be useful for the future developments of OSR’s research 
program. 
 
1 The two arguments in favour of OSR 
 
The difficulty of distinguishing mathematical from physical structure is related to another 
crucial question raised by French’s version of OSR, namely that of offering a clear and 
precise account of “object”. It is only after such an account that can we distinguish – within 
the old umbrella-term “entity” as it was used by Hacking (1983) – between object realism and 
ontic structural realism. Without such an account, we cannot make sense of French’s version 
of OSR: given his eliminationism about objects, structures and object must be sharply 
separated.  
Part of the problem of course lies in the unavoidable vagueness of the latter notion in 
ordinary language. French seems to take for granted that the unclear notion of object 
presupposes the clearer notion of “individual”: x counts as an object if and only if x possesses 
an identity, and therefore is an individual. But of course, at this point, the trouble is only 
shifted to the new question: which among the available theories of individuality should we 
prefer in order to establish whether x is an object?3 Should we opt for a reduction of 
individuality to properties or should we rather prefer a view that insists that identity is a 
primitive, irreducible, non-property-like feature of any entity? 
                                                
3 This problem had already been noted by Howard (2011). 
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However, if quantum physics underdetermines the choice between these two metaphysical 
theories, as French seems to claim in chapter 2, one should remain agnostic about the 
existence of objects (as in Epistemic Structural Realism). On the contrary, French surprisingly 
embraces an atheistic stance toward their non existence, in favour a theistic stance toward 
structures! In a nutshell, here is my reconstruction of his argument:  
1. Quantum physics underdetermines a choice between an ontology of individuals or non-
individuals (first motivation in favour of OSR). 
2. In order to overcome this unwanted underdetermination we should embrace an 
ontology of structures that is common to the two metaphysical views.  
3. Contemporary physics and in particular the group theoretic representations that 
underpin it, favours OSR: this second motivation for OSR is supposed to be 
independent of the first. 
4. OSR favours the priority of structures over individuals. 
5. Premises 3 and 4 imply that contemporary physics favours the priority of structures 
over individuals (reconceptualization or elimination of objects).  
6. Given 5, contemporary physics does not underdetermine the metaphysics of 
individuality, a fortiori in view of French’s eliminativism about objects! 
 
Of course contemporary physics is a “superset” of quantum statistical physics, but 1 and 6 are 
still contradictory: contemporary physics and quantum statistical physics either 
underdetermine together the metaphysics of individuality or together they do not. French, on 
the contrary, defends both 1 and 3, but it is not wholly clear whether he is justified in doing so. 
First, quantum statistics is incorporated as an essential and unquestioned component of 
contemporary physics. So why is it the case that whatever underdetermines quantum 
statistical physics does not also underdetermine contemporary physics at large? If it is the 
group theoretical approach to physics that breaks the underdetermination, this very approach 
should also eliminate the underdetermination argued by 1, given that both quantum statistical 
physics and contemporary physics at large, as French correctly notes (p. 43), are essentially 
underpinned by group-theoretical structures.  
On the other hand, and for the same reasons, if French is correct in claiming that 
differences solo numero are compatible with quantum statistical physics (for arguments in 
favour of this claim see Dorato and Morganti 2013), he should provide strong arguments in 
favour of the fact that such differences are implausible within a more general group-theoretic 
approach to the ontology of fundamental physics, even though group theory underpins also 
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quantum statistics. If I am not wrong, these arguments have not been provided. It follows that 
the evidence in favour of OSR is substantially weakened, because one of the two motivations 
in its favour must go (not everything…). In view of the relevance of group theoretic structures 
to describe and explain the physical world, I think that if asked and really had to choose, 
French would jettison the argument expressed in 1. And in fact, the book argues that an 
investigation into the problem of how mathematical models represent the world shows that 
group structural realism (GSR) is the best articulation of OSR.  
On the other hand, it is clear why French cannot drop 1 altogether. The reason has to do 
with the already mentioned, undeniable vagueness of, the meaning of “individual” or “object”. 
An answer to the question “why should two electrons be regarded as non-individuals (non-
object like) simply in virtue of their indistinguishability?” presupposes either an arbitrary 
stipulation or some sort of essentialism about the meaning of “individual” or “object”. For 
obvious reasons, neither strategy can be accepted by French. The former would trivialize OSR; 
the latter is incompatible with the fact that concepts, scientific ones included, change and that 
science invents new concepts (fields, for instance) that don’t fit into the ordinary language 
categories. Consequently, the underdetermination thesis in 1 ought to be generalized to other 
physical theories (say relativity vis à vis the presentism/eternalism, or the 
perdurantism/endurantism debates), at least to the extent that metaphysical theories are based 
on ambiguous ordinary language notions (individual, parts, substance property, etc.) that are 
simply unfit to interpret the new language of contemporary physics. This is exactly what I 
think should be admitted, an acknowledgment that would jeopardise a good portion of 
contemporary metaphysics of science; but this is the topic for another paper.  
 
2 The problem of the representation of the structure of physical phenomena  
 
According to French physical theories are classes of models and their way of representing 
the world is one of the strongest arguments in favour of OSR. To clarify the nature of the 
model-world relation is to solve the question I want to focus on, namely how to characterize 
the difference between mathematical and physical structure in OSR in a precise way, without 
having to concede that it is vague (Ladyman and Ross 2007), which is way to blur his 
ontological stance.  
In trying to solve this problem, French relies on Brading and Landry’s distinction between 
the presentation of a model and its representation (2006) but gives it a different twist, whose 
implications are not always clear. According to Brading and Landry, presenting a certain 
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structure is tantamount to specifying the relationship holding among theoretical models and 
data models of physical phenomena. However, in their view the theory-world connection 
requires something more, namely a notion of representation, which ought to specify the 
relationship holding between the kinds of objects presented by models and the individual 
phenomena that they are meant to represent (2006, pp. 576-577).  
In French’s interpretation, Brading and Landy’s distinction is meant to defend a two-
layered notion of representations. So he distinguishes between “the presentation of putative 
objects thanks to the shared structure that our theories make available and the representation 
of such objects (as features of the world) by those theories. The obvious question is then, how 
is this shared structure represented”? (p.101). The answer is that the semantic conception of 
theories suggests that, at the meta-level, a partial-set theoretic approach is the best instrument 
to represent the classes of models determined by physical theories, and therefore the group 
theoretic structure shared by theoretical models, data models and, as the passage above 
suggests, physical structure. On the other hand, it is this very same group-theoretic structure 
that is practically used by physicists for a lower-level representation of physical phenomena. 
By defending these two different levels of “representations” and by later construing a detailed 
account of how group theoretical structure represents physical phenomena, French aims to 
fend off the charge that OSR reifies mathematical structure by confusing the physical 
structure of phenomena as represented (in Brading and Landry’s sense) by group theoretical 
structure with the meta-level representation of the latter structure allowed by partial set theory.  
However, there are at least three perplexities raised by this view and French’s use of the 
notion of presentation.  
1. Presenting a structure, in Brading and Landry’s terminology, does not involve the 
model-world relationship as French has it in the quotation above (“sharing the structure”), but, 
more appropriately, only a relation between abstract mathematical models. It is only in this 
literal sense that the notion of sharing is applicable, since isomorphisms or morphisms of any 
kind can only hold between mathematical, causally inert structures and not between such 
structures and the physical world, as the passage above seems to indicate. The fact that 
according to French there is there only one type of sharing while there are two notions of 
representation creates the risk of reifying mathematical structures, and therefore a collapse of 
the two kinds of structures, at least until a precise notion of physical structure is provided. 
2 French explicitly claims that it is the lower level, group theoretical representation of 
phenomena as it is practically used by physicists that can provide decisive evidence in favor 
of the priority of physical relations over individual objects (p.102). To the extent that it 
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enables us to draw such metaphysical conclusions, French ought to regard group theoretical 
structure as philosophically more important than set theoretical structure, as the Group 
Structural Realism (GSR) defended in chapter 6 also seems to imply. Given this priority, 
however, it is not clear why he insists on the necessity of a meta-theoretical representation of 
models in terms of partial set theory.  
3. physical phenomena do not determine the kind of theoretical models that are used to 
represent them. Not only are such models not deducible from physical phenomena, but 
furthermore they simplify them drastically, by abstracting away many of their details: the 
partial-isomorphism approach, that is meant to capture this incompleteness of our 
representational devices, makes this problem only more evident. French is aware of this 
difficulty (p. 138), but it is not clear whether he can solve it. One cannot exclude the existence 
of “left-over entities that might not be captured, or captured only “partially”, by the kind of 
mathematical representation of physical phenomena that is forced upon us by our cognitive 
structure – a sort of Kantian condition of “knowability” of phenomena that Eddington and 
Cassirer in different ways insisted upon but that French does not discuss at all.  
Furthermore, since physical phenomenal constrain mathematical structure only to a 
certain extent, without a precise account of what it means to claim that the former share their 
structure with the latter, it is not clear why the model-world relation afforded by these 
structures should suggest a “reconceptualisation” of physical objects in structural terms. 
OSR’s urgent problem is therefore not “how to best represent the shared structure of physical 
models” (chapter 5), but rather “what is the nature of the physical stuff that does the sharing?”  
 
3 OSR as Group Structural Realism (GSR) 
 
In order to answer this question (chapter 6), French understandably relies on the 
representational power offered by group theory. Symmetry and invariance, key group-
theoretic notions of contemporary physics, are our main guide to determine what is physically 
objective. As such, they are essential to ground the invariance of physical laws across 
scientific change and therefore to give a precise meaning to the fact that previous theories 
become particular cases of their more general successors. 
The central role of group theory in contemporary physics leads French to jump from a 
cautious epistemic structural realism to group structural realism (GSR), via an implicit appeal 
to an inference to the best explanation. In this perspective, group structure would not only 
enjoy just epistemic and heuristic priority in our search for fundamental features and entities 
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of the physical world, but would also have an ontic priority of some sort. The most plausible 
hypothesis to explain the success of physical theories using group theoretical structure is that 
these theories are approximately true. But the truth of these theories implies the claim that 
that the objective features of the physical world (however they are conceptualized) are 
accurately and effectively described by the group theoretical structure of our mathematized 
models.  
Apart from the philosophically controversial recourse to the inference to the best 
explanation, there is no excess metaphysical bag in this italicized statement, and I think that 
any physicist could endorse it. Troubles arise to the extent that GSR is supererogatively after 
something more: what do we gain when to the uncontroversial effectiveness of group theory 
we add the supererogatory claim that “group structure is real”? Unless a clear answer is 
provided to the question: “what instantiates the group structure?”, we should conclude that 
GSR is either false or trivial. It is false because the physical world is not a group nor can it 
literally share structure with mathematical models for the reasons given above. It is trivial 
because an answer to the question “what is the group theoretical structure of physical models 
about?” cannot be “the structure of the physical world”: this viciously circular reply would 
not be very illuminating if we don’t know how to understand “physical structure”. 
In a word, I submit that the only meaning of the expression “the physical world has the 
structure of a group and group structures are exist” is “the physical world instantiates such 
structure” 4: U(1) x SU(2) x SU(3)  represent the fundamental ontology of the physical world, 
in the sense that the latter instantiates the former. But this claim can also be accepted in an 
empiricist approach, since lacking further arguments that French here does not provide, the 
“physical world” may well coincide with the “physical phenomena saved by our models”. In 
this case, GSR collapses into group structural phenomenalism or epistemic structural realism, 
since group theory becomes “just” an epistemically powerful means to describe physical 
phenomena.  
 
4 Eliminating objects without giving up causation? 
 
In less radical versions of OSR, elementary particles do exist but are “thin objects” in the 
sense that their identity depend on the relational structure in which they are embedded. 
French’s more radical, eliminationist version of OSR instead claims that particles literally do 
                                                
4 For the similar claim about “spacetime exists” see my (2000). 
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not exist as individuals or objects, and must be reconceptualized in group structural terms. 
Arguments in favor of this view are yielded by the structural conception of laws à la Cassirer, 
and by the fact that (i) quantum particles and their measurable properties “are” irreducible 
representations of the relevant symmetry groups and (ii) even their apparent intrinsic 
properties (spin mass and charge) are “structurally derived” (Lyre 2011). How is this “are” to 
be interpreted, epistemically or ontically? 
A representation of a group is a homomorphism from the group to the automorphism group 
of another causally inert entity. However, single elementary particles leave tracks on a 
fluorescent screen: qua causally active, they cannot be just representations of groups and can 
be abstract only qua kinds. So French’s fundamental physical structure must be endowed with 
causal efficacy not only to make sense of its effects in the labs around the world, but also to 
explain away the apparent causal efficacy of macro-objects, which, given French’s 
reductionism, must be completely dependent on the fundamental relational structure of the 
world. In fact, if macro-objects could be regarded as causally active independently of the 
fundamental relational microstructure to which they allegedly reduce, we would have a good 
reason to believe in their autonomous existence: causal efficacy is usually treated as a 
sufficient criterion for existence. As a consequence, macro-objects would not be eliminable. 
French deals with Psillos’ (2006) objection that causation needs an ontology of objects in 
two steps. The first consists in the elimination of everyday objects – qua potential carriers of 
causal relations – from the ontology of the world: it follows that if there is causation in 
physics, it must reside in the fundamental group theoretic structure of the world. The second 
step consists in an attempt to introduce causation at the fundamental level, in the hypothesis 
that causation is not folk science. I will now discuss these two steps in turn.  
1) According to French’s revisionary metaphysics, the talk about the macroscopic objects 
of the manifest image is a practical expedient that will not be abandoned (as talk of quantum 
particles as objects in the laboratory), even though such objects can be eliminated from the 
catalogue of things that exists via their reconceptualization in terms of the fundamental 
relational structure of the universe. Of course, we need to know why macro-object talk is so 
useful without invoking any correspondence with reality. But even supposing that a solution 
to this problem can be provided, and that particles are not individuals, arguments by analogy 
between micro and macro-stuff fail. First, two identical tables, unlike quantum particles, have 
an uncontroversial identity in virtue of their different spatiotemporal location. Secondly, 
physics may describe the microcomponents of the wood of which my table is made of, and 
can explain why its macroscopic properties are what they seem to be to us, but its object 
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language does not contain “tables” (as Stebbing already noted in 1937 a propos of Eddington 
famous riddle). Thirdly, x is a table or a chair iff a human being attributes x the function that 
it usually has. The intentional and functional component of man-made macroobjects, 
currently at least, cannot be reproduced by physics. The conclusion is that strategies for the 
elimination of macroobjects and microobjects cannot be regarded as similar at all, and that 
tables cannot easily be eliminated in terms of physicalistic language, despite the fact that they 
are physical objects. 
Other forms of eliminative reduction of macroobjects suffer from other difficulties. The 
first, widely discussed by French, involves mereological reductionism: can we regard my 
table as a collection of atoms, in such a way that we do not have two entities, the table and the 
collection of atoms, but one entity, the table regarded as identical to the sum of its simple 
components? This is one of the views that French considers to be more plausible: “What 
makes the sentence table exists true are whatever we take the fundament constituent to be” (p 
175). However, it has been convincingly argued that mereological reductionism does not 
apply to quantum mechanics (Healey 2013, Caulton 2015). Surprisingly, French does not give 
the necessary attention to problem of quantum compositionality and in order to eliminate 
macro-objects seems to rely on the part/whole relation of classical mereology!  
Secondly, eliminative reductions of macroobjects to microstructure cannot succeed until 
we have a more precise idea of the ontology of the reducing theory, i.e., until we know with 
some more precision what a “physical structure” is. And as we will see below, French did not 
succeed in clarifying this problem 
Thirdly, the more plausible strategies for his eliminationism, the reductive ones, are either 
too weak or too strong. A mere ontological reduction will not do, since tables are physical 
objects even if functionally defined: the ontological reduction in this case is not as interesting 
as that invoked in the mind-body problem. An explanatory view of reduction is also too weak, 
since it does not necessarily eliminate macroobjects and their macroproperties: I can explain 
solidity in terms of atomic structure and chemical bonds, without eliminating the emergent, 
collective property: single atoms and their bonds are not solid, only the table is.  
It then follows that in order to pursue an eliminative reduction of macroobjects to quantum 
structure one needs a stronger, identity theory: if I reduce x to y by showing that x is y, then I 
can treat x as non existent. However, this form of eliminative reduction is not justifiable even 
in the only clearly defined, strongest theory of reduction, namely Nagel’s. Even supposing 
that one could get around the fact that there are no laws of tables and chairs as such, x is not 
eliminated in favour of y, given that the “is” in the sentence is an identity. Analogously, the 
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macroscopic property “temperature of a gas” is not eliminated by statistical mechanics, in 
virtue the fact that temperature is mean molecular motion! Temperature is a real (though 
emergent) property of a gas: otherwise there would be nothing to reduce. If there are no clear 
examples of eliminative reductions in physics how can a reduction of everyday objects to 
fundamental physical structure be successful?  
This may explain why the eliminative view of macroobjects as presented in chapter 7 is 
merely promissory, as he himself acknowledges (p. 189). In this chapter in particular, French 
begins by supposing a paradoxical thesis T, and then presents an extremely well-informed 
review of the existing literature in order to show how T could be defended but does not take 
stock, even if the wealth of new and original arguments pro and cons the various positions 
that are presented is really remarkable. 
 
4.2 The second step: can we introduce causation in the fundamental relational structure? 
 
In fairness to French, the problem of drawing a border between abstract, mathematical 
structure and physical structure is there for anyone, since it depends in part on the difficulty of 
finding a distinction between abstract and concrete. For instance, entities may be abstract in 
the spatiotemporal sense and yet be physical, as 3N configuration space might be required by 
the reality of the wave function. The criterion involving causation seems less controversial, 
and seems to be shared both by traditional objects-realists and structural realists like French. 
If mathematical entities are defined as causally inert, in order to avoid the collapse of physical 
onto mathematical structure, French must embody causation in his structuralist ontology, 
while avoiding at the same an ontology of objects as carriers of causal activity.  
In order to achieve this aim, he endorses the process view of causation, in which the 
persistence of events in time – regarded as worldliness – is dependent upon their structure. 
This means that, say, the interaction of two particles regarded as objects is to be thought of in 
terms of “a system of relations some of which might be described as causal, where that notion 
is appropriately characterized in this context” (p.213). In a word, events are not instantiations 
of properties by objects; rather, the interactions of particles qua events must be 
reconceptualised in structuralistic terms: as advocated by Esfeld (2009), relations (or bundles 
thereof) can be causally powerful. 
Admittedly, the picture is rather vague and promissory to say the least; plus, the threat of 
the blob-universe sticks it ugly head again. Suppose that properties are causal powers. If 
causal powers of properties were themselves structural, then “iteration” would lead to the 
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view that the only causally empowered stuff is the universe/blob discussed above. In order to 
avoid this consequence, French notes that it is not incoherent to be structuralist about objects 
and their properties but not about their causal power (p. 218). How reasonable is this move?  
Take two masses in Newtonian dynamics: m1 and m2. According to his proposal, the 
particles and their property “mass” dissolve in a network of relations but the power to attract 
other masses is non-structural and therefore non-relational. In this case, however, this 
attractive power, shared by the two masses, would be intrinsic to them. The problem in this 
case is that, presumably, in  OSR a causal power should itself be relational, lest there exists a 
bundle of intrinsic powers that is be regarded as object-like. However, if one cannot stop to 
analyse these causal powers in structural terms, we are led eventually to the blob-cosmos, the 
partless One, or the night in which all the cows are black. 
The argument is quickly presented. Suppose that the particles having mass entails that they 
have a power to attract other particles and therefore a power to generate a gravitational force 
Grav(m1,m2), that is a causal relation between them to be regarded as the manifestation of 
their shared power. But the two masses taken together can be regarded as a unique bundle B12 
(mass is additive) constituted by the relation Grav(m1, m2), that in its turn must be related to 
other masses, m3, m4, and their bundles and so on until we end with the one, or the blob  
In conclusion, I think that French’s book has the merit to take OSR to its logical 
conclusions: the options for ontic structural realists are either an endorsement of Tegmark’s 
Pitagoreanism or of blob-objectivism. Given this dilemma, dropping OSR seems unavoidable, 
at least until its main formulation can be – somewhat unfairly – summarized by the following 
passage: “perhaps the most intuitive plausible form of structuralism is precisely one according 
to which objects and their properties are metaphysically dissolved into a ‘multilayered’ 
network of relations, where certain of these relation are causally empowered and where this 
empowerment for want of a better word is inherent to the relations". (p. 218) 
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